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THE INTERSECTION OF RACE, BOND, AND "CRIMMIGRATION"
IN THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM
Tremaine Hemans*
The United States ("U.S.") Supreme Court's recent decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez' has
potentially opened another avenue for people of color to become entangled in the U.S.' predatory
immigration system, through the denial of bail hearings. Denial of periodic bond hearings ensures
that many detainees in immigration facilities will be held indefinitely until these detainees' cases
are adjudicated. In Jennings, the Court held that detained aliens do not have a right to periodic
bond hearings even if they are detained for prolonged periods of time, due to the language of the
mandatory and discretionary detention statutes at §§ 1225(b)(1)-(2) and §§ 1226(a),(c) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.2 This holding perpetuates the U.S.' tradition of immigration laws
having an overwhelmingly negative effect of mass incarceration and criminalization on people of
color. 3

Immigration laws fall under the plenary power of the federal government, wherein only the
Executive and Legislative branches have the power to make immigration policies.4 Therefore, the
federal government is free to use this plenary power to engage in blatant racism by creating laws
that exclude, deport, and punish immigrants.5 Regardless of whether the current administration is
focused on strict immigration laws, the demographics of detention centers depict a clear, disparate
impact on people of color.6 Each administration, new legislative body, and judiciary cause more
harm to the immigrant community, and especially to people of color. This is done by pushing their
own agendas and interpreting immigration laws as they stand, rather than seeking and
implementing immigration reform.

* Tremaine L. Hemans is a 3L at the Florida International University College of Law, graduating in May
2019. Hemans has dedicated her fledgling legal career to the field of Immigration Law. She has done over 300 hours
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and Human Rights Clinic. She has interned with the Office of the Chief Counsel for the Immigration Customs
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security; Fonte Immigration Firm; and Immigration Lawyers USA. The
author would like to thank Professors Michele Anglade, Janewa Osei-Tutu and Margaret Brenan Correoso for their
continued encouragement; Adrien Hemans, Michelle McNab-Hemans, Raven Green, Paul Green, Donna Thompson,
and Otis Paul, who have been the supportive family every law student deserves; and mentees Loune- Djenia Askew
and Kathleen Leon. Philippians 4:13.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
2 Id. (holding that U. S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking
admission into the country under the mandatory detention statutes at 8 U.S.C §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) and the
discretionary detention statute at § 1226(a)).
See generally Kevin Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Laws and
Enforcement, 72 L. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (2009).
4 Id. at 7.
Eli J. Kay-Oliphant, ConsideringRace in American Immigration Jurisprudence,54 EMORY L.J. 681, 70001 (2005) (discussing the misuse of the plenary power doctrine in American immigration policies).
6Id.
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Since the creation of U.S. immigration laws, people of color have been disparately impacted
by predatory immigration laws and policies.' The effect of predatory immigration laws on people
of color mirrors the effects of the criminal justice system; however, more protections are given to
those trapped in the criminal justice system. The Jennings decision has the potential to promote
and deepen the effects of predatory immigration laws on people of color.
Here, we analyze the interaction of race, mass incarceration through bond denial, and the
criminalization of people of color persistent throughout U.S. immigration law.
i.

History of Basing Immigration Benefits on "Whiteness"

What society identifies as race is not scientific, but instead, is the result of social structures,
historical truths, and attitudes that have shaped society's way of thinking, resulting in some racial
groups advancing at the expense of others.8 This advancement is a result of privileges obtained
based on markers of race. These markers of race mean nothing until they are given meaning, and
then that meaning is attached to social constructions and laws that allocate these privileges based
on the racial markers.9 U.S. immigration laws were born out of this manifestation of racism.
In 1790, the Naturalization Act excluded all non-whites from obtaining citizenship.10 This
marked the birth of an immigration system that favored white people over people of color, which
has persisted through legislation and jurisprudence.11 Following the Naturalization Act of 1790,
the legislature doled out several early immigration laws that discriminated against immigrants if
they were not considered white. The judiciary also decided numerous cases that perpetuated
racism, expressly outlining that Asians were not white.12 For example, in Takao Ozawa v. United
States, the Supreme Court in 1922 denied a Japanese American citizenship because he was not
white as defined by the naturalization statute and the prevailing science at the time." Further,
during the period after the 1790 Naturalization Act, the legislature enacted the Johnson-Reed Act
of 1924, which created quotas of Asian-Americans. 14 This essentially barred them from
immigration benefits until 1952, perpetuating our modern concept of race by substituting
"whiteness" as a marker of eligibility for citizenship.1 In UnitedStates v. BhagatSingh Thind, the
Court decided that an Indian Sikh man, scientifically determined to be white, was still not racially
eligible for citizenship because he was not what the common white man would consider to be
Id. at 15.
Race-The Power of an Illusion, Episode 3: The House We Live In, PBS (2003),
http://www.pbs.org/race/000_About/002_04-about-03.htm (discussing the intersection of immigration laws and race,
and also depicts how immigration laws were created out of racism).
Id.
o Warren J. Blumenfeld, ImmigrationLaws as Official 'Racial'Policy,HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2014,
11:00 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/warren-j-blumenfeld/immigration-laws-as-offic b 5601240.html.
" Kay-Oliphant, supranote 5.
12 The House We Live In, supra note 8.
1 Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922).
14 Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (replaced by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965).
15 John DiPippa, Book Review - Whiteness of a Different Color, 36 ARK. LAW. 17 (2001) (reviewing
8

MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR (1998)).
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white 16 This case was decided three months after Ozawa and shows that the laws governing
immigration continue to "move the line" of what it means to be eligible for U.S. immigration
benefits based on race.
In 1965 efforts were made to reform the immigration system; however, U.S. immigration laws
still found ways to discriminate against people of color." For example, policies such as the
preference visas were implemented." The preference visa system is a method of distributing a
limited amount of immigrant visas and employment visas per year.19 In the preference visa system,
there are various annual limits on the number of immigrants to the U.S. from certain countries. 20
Visa waivers and shorter wait times are available for European countries, which perpetuate
discrimination in unfairly stacking the laws against certain races 21 Immigrants of Filipino and
Mexican nationality are just a few that are negatively impacted by this policy as they must wait in
excess of twenty-four years for a visa in certain visa categories. 22 In an effort to remedy this
problem, the legislature enacted the 1986 Immigration Reform Act, but still included extra visas
for some mostly European countries.23 A look at the current visa bulletin shows that the
preference visa system still fails people of color as most of the caps listed on the Department of
State's December 2018 visa bulletin refer to the number of visas available to Central American
Countries, Asia, Mexico and the Philippines. 24
ii.

Convergence Between Predatory Criminal Laws and Immigration Laws

To fully understand how predatory immigration laws create another pipeline that promote
discrimination towards people of color, we must look at the parallels to the criminal justice system.
The U.S. incarceration rates have increased by 500% over the last forty years, making it the leader
in incarceration with 2.2 million people currently in our nation's prisons and jails.25 It is well
established that the American criminal justice system disproportionately affects people of color as

United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 207 (1923).
David Cook-Martin & David Scott FitzGerald, How Legacies of Racism Persist in U.S. Immigration
Policy, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (June 20, 2014), http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/brief/howlegacies-racism-persist-us-immigration-policy.
1 See 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
1 See 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012); see also U.S. Dep't of State, Visa BulletinforDecember2018, (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-lawO/visa-bulletin/2019/visa-bulletin-for-december-2018.html.
20
U.S. Dep't of State, Visa Bulletin for December 2018, (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-lawO/visa-bulletin/2019/visa-bulletin-for-december-2018.html.
16
17

21Id.
22

Id.
Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub.L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986); see also U.S. Dep't of State,
Visa Bulletin for December 2018, (Nov. 8, 2018), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-lawO/visabulletin/2019/visa-bulletin-for-december-2018.html.
24 U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 20.
25 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections, httns://sentencinnroject.or/wocontent/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf (last visited April 11, 2019).
23
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well.26 Blacks and Hispanics represent thirty-two percent of the population in the U.S., 21yet they

account for over sixty percent of the prison population nationwide.,2 Naturally, this reality casts a
shadow on immigration law in the form of what is known as the "crimmigration" system.
Crimmigration is the term that represents the convergence between immigration and criminal laws
in the U.S. 29 Crimmigration "is a product of the growing criminalization of immigration violations
on the one hand, and the expansion of criminal grounds for removal on the other." 30
In 2013, President Barack Obama, in his attempt to focus immigration enforcement resources
on individuals with criminal records, sought to justify a detention and removal campaign that
oversaw the deportation of 438,421 immigrants.31 This was an attempt to effectuate a focus on
"felons not families." 32 This act of the administration snowballed into devastating results for those
immigrants entangled in the crimmigration system. Since the criminal justice system already
disproportionately affects people of color, it follows then, that targeting immigrants with criminal
records creates a disparate impact on people of color, becoming a compound issue. The
Department of Homeland Security does not provide data based on the demographics of noncitizens in detention facilities. However, using black immigrants as a sample, data shows that
although black immigrants only account for 5.4% of unauthorized immigrant population in the
U.S., and 7.2% of the total non-citizen population, they made up 10.6% of all immigrants in
removal proceedings between 2003 and 2015.33 Black immigrants represent a disproportionate
number of immigrants facing deportation in immigration court on criminal grounds. 34 Further,
despite only representing 7.2% of the non-citizen population, black immigrants make up 20.3% of
immigrants facing deportation on criminal grounds.35 Therefore, black immigrants
disproportionately represent the number of detained immigrants with criminal histories. 3 6
Additionally, Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the
Department of Homeland Security's 287(g) Program's Jail Enforcement Teams to partner with
state and local law enforcement agencies,37 to interview arrestees regarding their immigration
status.38 This arrangement creates a proverbial pipeline for people of color to be discarded into the
crimmigration system because, "although African Americans and Hispanics make up
CriminalJustice FactSheet, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet (last visited May

26

9,2018).
Id.
Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections- Racial Disparity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (June 2018),
https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf
29 Emily Ryo, Detained: A Study oflmmigrationBond Hearings, 50 LAW &SOC'Y REV. 117,119 (2016).
30 Id.
31 Juliana Morgan-Trostle &Kexin Zheng, The State ofBlack Immigrants, Partll: Black Immigrants in the
27

28
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Criminalization

System,
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BLACK

IMMIGRANTS

http://www.stateofblackimmigrants.com.
32 Id.
3 Id. at 20.
34
35

Id.
Id.

Id. at 16.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1964 § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2014).
38 Morgan-Trostle &Zheng, supra note 30.
36

3
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(2016),

approximately 32% of the U.S. population, they comprised 56% of all incarcerated people in
2015."'39 To put this all in perspective, a white person is five times less likely to be incarcerated in
the criminal justice system, 40 therefore a white non-citizen is less likely to have a criminal record,
and thus less likely to be funneled into the crimmigration pipeline.
Despite the convergence of the criminal and immigration system, a non-citizen with a criminal
record is not afforded the same protections he was granted under the criminal justice system.
Immigration law is classified as civil and not criminal law; therefore, detainees in immigration
detention centers do not have a right of access to a court-appointed attorney, a free phone call, or
a speedy trial. The U.S. criminal justice system provides more safeguards than the immigration
system. For example, in the criminal justice system, law enforcement must have reasonable
suspicion to pull someone over. 41 Such a protection is not afforded to non-citizens in the
immigration system. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court stated that racial
profiling is acceptable as part of a border patrol officer's reason for pulling someone over. 42 This
illustrates how certain inalienable rights provided to citizens are not available to aliens. This trend
moves the proverbial needle farther away in terms of what it means to be an "admitted'A 3
immigrant in the U.S.
iii.

Jennings v. Rodriguez and its Effects on Bond Determination for Detained
Immigrants

The Jennings plurality decision provides a snapshot of the nation's current view of immigration
law through our jurisprudence and legislature. 44 Jennings established that U.S. immigration law
does not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention
and could not be plausibly interpreted as implicitly placing a six-month limit on detention. 45 in
criminal proceedings, pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, defendants are
protected from unnecessary pre-trial incarceration and are afforded a right to bail that is not
excessive. 46 However, the Court in Jennings decided that detainees are not entitled to periodic
bond hearings. 47 Despite pretrial detention being a cause of the spike in the rate of incarceration in

' CriminalJustice Fact Sheet, supra note 25.
41
41
42

CriminalJustice Fact Sheet, supra note 25.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1962) (requiring police officers to have reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect).
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Here, the Court decided that Border Patrol officers

stopping a vehicle solely based on the "apparent Mexican ancestry" of vehicle occupants amounts to violation of
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the Court also said that officers need only have a
reasonable suspicion that occupants of the vehicle are undocumented immigrants to constitutionally make such a stop
and that such a suspicion can be based partly, but not entirely, on the occupants' apparent Mexican ancestry.
4 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13) (2014) ("The terms 'admission' and 'admitted'
mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization
by an immigration officer").
4 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
45

Id.

U.S. Const. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted").
4 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
46
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the U.S., 48 defendants are afforded the opportunity to await trial as a free person. 49 That is not the
case for non-citizens entangled in the crimmigration system, as the Jennings opinion highlights.
The crimmigration system promotes mass incarceration of non-citizens, who are required to be
detained until their cases are adjudicated. 0
The U.S. is the leader of criminal detention in the world, which is exacerbated by the denial of
bond hearings in the immigration context. 51 The U.S. also has the largest immigration detention
infrastructure in the world and detains approximately 380,000 to 442,000 persons per year.52 It is
estimated that taxpayers spend two billion dollars per year on immigration detention.53 The denial
of bond hearings dramatically increases the number of people held in detention facilities while
awaiting adjudication of their cases. The issue is that bond is not a right for the immigrant but is
granted at the discretion of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).54 Therefore, thousands
of immigrants are funneled into detention centers while awaiting relief or deportation.
Consequently, there has been a vast spike in detained immigrants. In the 2017 fiscal year ICE
projected an average daily detention population of roughly 31,000. In the 2018 fiscal year, ICE
reports a daily population of 40,726 with projections for a detention population of 51,379., This
spike represents an expansion of sixty-five percent in just one year.56 Further, private prison
companies are profiting from these numbers in detainees because they hold about seventy-one
percent of the average daily population of US jails.57

Interestingly, most of the immigrants detained due to mandatory detention statutes are marked
as "non-criminal", 5 having been detained for reasons other than having a criminal record. An
average of seventy-one percent of detainees were subject to "mandatory detention" in the first
fiscal month of 201 8. On average, fifty-one percent of the daily population that month were
marked as "non-criminal," and were classified as posing "no threat."6 o
41 Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of PretrialDetention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment:
Evidencefrom Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REv. 201, 203 (2018).
49 Id.
o Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
51 Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections- Racial Disparity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (June 2018),
https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf
52 NYLPI Report On Medical Neglect In Immigrant Detention Facilities Inspires Senators To Demand A
Response From The Trump Administration, NYLPI (June 5, 2017), https://www.nylpi.org/nylpi-report-on-medicalneglect-in-immigrant-detention-facilities-inspires-senators-to-demand-a-response-from-the-trump-admiistration/.
5 Ryo, A Study oflmmigration Bond Hearings, supra note 28, at 118.
54 Ryo, A Study oflmmigration Bond Hearings, supra note 28, at 121.
5 Garret Epps, How the Supreme Court is Expandingthe ImmigrantDetention System, THE ATLANTIC (Mar.
9, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/jennings-v-rodriguez/555224/.
56
5

Id.
Tara Tidwell Cullen, ICE Released its Most Comprehensive Immigration Detention Data Yet. It's

Alarming., NATIONAL IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CENTER, http://immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/ice-released-its-most-

comprehensive-immigration-detention-data-yet (last visited May 10, 2018).
58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id.
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For those detainees with a criminal record, the relevant legal factor that determines whether a
detainee will get bond is whether the detainee poses a danger to society or is a flight risk based on
the detainees' prior criminal history.61 Although Jennings does not address the standard used to
determine bond, there are several rationales as to why such emphasis would be placed on a noncitizens criminal history as a major determinant in whether they receive bond. First, there is the
sheer volume of cases that pour into an immigration judge's courtroom. 62 Moreover, there is a
significant shortage of law clerks and language interpreters in immigration courts.63 Additionally,
the computers and other technological equipment used to record the bond hearings are in such
disrepair that immigration judges have reported equipment failures as one of the reasons why a
non-citizen's criminal background is a deciding factor in whether the detainee obtains bond. 4
They state that this is because the system is so overworked and does not have the necessary
resources to properly determine whether bond should be granted.6 1Second, an immigration judge's
focus to place exclusive significance on criminal history in bond decisions could relate to riskaversion. 66 Judges face significant pressure and might find it "less professionally risky to focus on
prior criminal histories and to err on the side of detaining non-citizens with multiple or serious
criminal convictions", even if the conviction is not be a violent offense.6 Third, detainees wear
government issued uniforms that are brightly colored and are similar to those worn by criminal
inmates in jail.,6 Detainees appearing before an immigration judge are usually wearing this
uniform and are routinely shackled for transport. 69 Therefore, a detainee attending a proceeding in
shackles and a jumpsuit could be already perceived by the court as a criminal, whereas in criminal
proceedings, they may be allowed to wear a suit. These contextual factors in immigration bond
hearings might reinforce perceptions of criminality of immigrant detainees and affect whether a
non-citizen is granted bond 7
Access to counsel significantly affects whether a person will be granted bond. The odds of a
detainee who is represented by an attorney being granted bond is 3.5 times higher than those who
appeared pro se. However, a non-citizen is not guaranteed assistance of counsel, 2 and most go
before an immigration judge without representation 73 In fact, in a recent national study conducted
by Eagly and Shafter of over 1.2 million immigration removal cases decided between 2007 and
2013, "only thirty-seven percent of non-citizens had legal representation." 74This same study found
61 Ryo, A Study oflmmigration Bond Hearings,supra note 28, at 120.

62 Id. at 146.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 147.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70

Id.

71

Id. at 143.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(4)(A).

7

7 Ryo, A Study oflmmigration Bond Hearings, supra note

74

Id.

75

28, at 124.

that those non-citizens who have representation are more likely to seek remedies and receive the
remedies they seek.7
Further, numerous studies have shown that "racial disparities in bond decisions are significant
and have been stable over time."'76 Considering that obtaining bond is already an uphill battle for
detainees, the Jennings decision stands to affect non-citizens of color in devastating ways, because
now bond hearings may not be a possibility for those awaiting adjudication of their case.

§1225(b) of Title 8 in the U.S. Code authorizes the mandatory detention of certain classes of
undocumented immigrants. Jennings established that the challenged statutes do not give detained
aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention and could not be
plausibly interpreted as implicitly placing a six-month limit on detention. In Jennings, a class of
non-citizens, some of whom had been in detention centers for years awaiting adjudication of their
case, challenged mandatory detention statutes and claimed that those statutes do not authorize
prolonged detention without an opportunity for a bond hearing.78 The non-citizens further claimed
that if the statutes do authorize "prolonged" detention without bond hearings, then the statutes
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The first challenged statute states that a respondent awaiting a determination on a credible
asylum case is subject to mandatory detention." The second challenged statute states that a
respondent is subject to mandatory detention while in removal proceedings if an immigration
officer has determined the respondent does not have a clear entitlement to admission to the U.S. 81
The third challenged statute states that a respondent may be detained while awaiting a pending
decision on whether they are to be removed from the U.S. 82 The final challenged statute mandates
when an alien with a criminal background must be detained 83 The Court reasoned the mandatory
detention statutes do not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings because the
language in the statutes are "unequivocal" and based on the literal interpretation of the words used;
the legislature intended that periodic bond hearings be precluded. 84 The Court further reasoned

7
76

Id.
Id. at 125 (quoting Free (2002: 206-10) and Free (2004) outlining racial disparities in bond decisions).

n7 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2012).

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
Id.
80 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2012) (emphasis added) (stating that "any alien subject to the procedures
under this clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to
have such a fear, until removed.").
81 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2)(A) (2012) (stating that Aliens covered by §1225(b)(2) in turn "shall be detained for
a [removal] proceeding" if an immigration officer "determines that [they are] not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled"
to admission).
8 8 U.S.C. §1226(a) (2012).
8 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) (2012).
84 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830, 833 (2018) (reasoning that §§1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) use the unequivocal
mandate
"shall be detained," and that the term "for" in §§1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) does not mandates detention only until the start
of applicable proceedings).
78

7

76

that the mandatory detention statutes impliedly limit the amount of time a respondent will be
detained and as such, the statutes do not perpetuate indefinite detention.85
Alarmingly, Jennings did not consider the enormous backlog the immigration legal system
currently faces. One of the mandatory detention statutes depends on the adjudication of asylum
claims by those found to have "credible fear" of persecution or torture.86 In the 2016 fiscal year
alone, 65,218 defensive asylum applications were filed by detained immigrants seeking relief from
deportation.8 ' In the same year, 115,399 affirmative asylum applications were filed by immigrants
seeking asylum upon entry into the U.S.88 Of both those numbers combined, only 20,455 were
granted asylum.89 On average, immigrants with an immigration court case who were "ultimately
granted relief such as asylum by March 2018 waited more than 1,000 days on average for that
outcome." 90 These statistics display the magnitude of the caseload asylum officers, immigration
officers and immigration judges face. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a respondent subject to
mandatory detention would have his asylum case adjudicated in a timely manner. A respondent
subject to mandatory detention under these circumstances, is likely to be detained for months or
years before having their case adjudicated. Further, people of color represent a majority of the
asylum applications that are filed each year. 91 The majority of those detained while awaiting
adjudication of asylum cases are people of color.92 Hence, the effect the Jenningsdecision will be
that the population of asylees awaiting adjudication will disproportionately represent people of
color.
In Jennings, Justice Alito, who wrote the plurality opinion of the court, opined that "[d]etention
during those proceedings gives immigration officials time to determine [whether] an alien's status
without running the risk of the alien either absconding or engaging in criminal activity before a
final decision has been made." 93 Again, the Court fails to take the state of the current immigration
system into consideration. The "risk" Justice Alito refers to, of a non-immigrant engaging in
85

Id.
Questions

&
Answers:
Credible
Fear
Screening,
USCIS.GOV,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questions-answers-credible-fear-screening
(last
updated, July 15, 2015). For individuals seeking asylum based on credible fear, there must be a "significant possibility"
that the applicant will show the Immigration Judge that the applicant has been persecuted or has a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion if returned to their country.
8 Jie Zong, Jeanne Batalova, and Jeffrey Hallock, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and
86
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POLICY

INSTITUTE

(Feb.

8,

2018),

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states.
88 Id.
o American Immigration Council, Asylum in the United States, (May 14, 2018),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/asylum-united-states
9 Jie Zong, Jeanne Batalova, and Jeffrey Hallock, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and
Immigration

in

the

United

States,

MIGRATION

POLICY

INSTITUTE

(Feb.

8,

2018),

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states.
92 Id.
" Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018) (stating that "congress has authorized immigration
officials to detain some classes of aliens during the course of certain immigration proceedings").
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criminal activity, is a misplaced and baseless alarmist tactic that has been perpetuated through
jurisprudence, the law and now the media. This stereotype would have us believe immigrants have
a predisposition to commit crime and as such present a "risk" to law abiding citizens. 94 Studies
show non-citizens are less likely than the U.S. born citizens "to be repeat offenders" and
"immigrant youths who were students in U.S. middle and high schools... and are now young
adults have among the lowest delinquency rates of all young people." 95
As aforementioned, most of those detained, were identified as "non-criminal," and as posing
"no threat" 96 and only a minute portion of those detained in immigration detention centers are high
threat criminals. 97 These statistics reveal that a majority of the detainees are non-criminal. Further,
Justice Alito's assertion, that keeping non-immigrants detained is in furtherance of protecting
citizens against the "risk" of detainees committing crimes, is unsupported and contradicted by
studies that show a lower rate of recidivism of non-citizens compared to citizens. 98

iv.

Jennings Dissent by Justice Breyer: The Voice of Reason.

In his passionate dissent to the Jennings plurality opinion, Justice Breyer's interpretation of
the statute focused on the injustice that would result if the mandatory detention statutes are
interpreted to not allow periodic bond hearings for detained noncitizens. 99 One of his concerns was
the length of detention that some of the appellees faced 100 In his dissent he outlined that "[t]he
record shows that the Government detained some asylum seekers for 831 days (nearly 2A2 years),
512 days, 456 days, 421 days, 354 days, 319 days, 318 days, and 274 days before they won their
cases and received asylum." 101 He explained that some of the appellees, who had been detained
for two or three years, would have received bail hearings a long time ago had they been taken into
custody within the U.S. rather than at the border 102 His interpretation would require bail hearings
presumptively after six months of confinement. 103 He further reminded the Court that although
detained non-citizens technically are not admitted into the U.S., this is a "legal fiction" that should
not justify withholding basic rights from people. 104 As such, his interpretation of the statute would
follow the Supreme Court's "longstanding practice of construing a statute 'so as to avoid not only

4 The House We Live In, supra note 8 (stating that non-citizens immigrants and lower classes were thought
to have innate qualities of their race and a predisposition for commission of certain crimes).
5 Id.
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the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score."'105 This
constitutional argument, however, was not considered by the majority because the Court found the
Ninth Circuit's ruling faulty on statutory interpretation grounds, and therefore did not need to reach
a decision on the constitutionality arguments. 106
Justice Breyer then went on to interpret the words "shall" and "detain" as well, finding that the
phrase "shall be detained" does not mean detained without bail 107 He reasoned that the word
"detain" in this context could refer to "a comparatively long period of time" which could coexist
with bail 108 He further pointed out that precedent treats the word "detain" as consistent with
bail.109 In support, he cited that the Board of Immigration Appeals also treated the word "detain"
as consistent with bail, like the Court's decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, finding that "the words
'may be detained' were consistent with requiring release from long-term detention."o Justice
Breyer went on to point out that Congress did not mention long term detention without bail in the
statutes as it had done in other cases where long term detention was anticipated and therefore,
"Congress does not unambiguously authorize long-term detention without bail by failing to say
when detention must end."" Justice Breyer then points out that while another statute,
§1225(b)(1)(B)(iii), provides that certain aliens be detained until removed, that statute refers to
immigrants who do not have a credible fear of persecution, unlike the respondents in the Jennings
case. 11 2 Overall, Justice Breyer reasoned that Congress' intent was not to refuse bail where
prolonged confinement is an issue.113 As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent:
It is clear that the Fifth Amendment's protections extend to "all persons within the
territory of the United States.

. ."

But the Government suggests that those

protections do not apply to asylum seekers or other arriving aliens because the law
treats arriving aliens as if they had never entered the United States; hence they are
not held within its territory. This is, of course, false. All of these noncitizens are
held within the territory of the United States at an immigration detention facility.114
The issue in Jennings was whether the mandatory detention statutes could be plausibly
interpreted to have required periodic bond hearings.115 Because statutory interpretation requires
careful parsing of the words used in enumerating the statute, it is understandable that the majority
focused on those words. However, the issue of the necessity of bond and bond hearings for
detainees was lost on the majority. The majority spent more time defining the words "for" and
"shall" than focusing on the underlying reasons why this case was before the Court to begin with,
105
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Further, the dissent stated that two-thirds of the detainees seeking asylum receive the relief they
seek, including forty percent of those who had prior criminal sentences, bolstering the necessity of
bond hearings.116 Prior to this decision, non-citizens already faced significant challenges in terms
of outside factors (such as the clogged and inefficient immigration court system; the use of their
prior criminal history to determine bond; and the racial disparity in granting bond) that determine
whether they will be eligible to receive bond."' Now that door seems to be closed.
v.

Judicial Complacency Instead of Reform

Justice Alito's plurality opinion in the Jennings decision mentions the constitutional avoidance
canon, which allows a court to ignore interpretations of a statute that is susceptible to multiple
interpretations, if those interpretations result in "serious constitutional doubts"."' In referencing
this canon, Justice Alito stated that "a court relying on that canon still must interpret the statute,
not rewrite it." 1 9 However, this shows complacency because simply interpreting immigration laws
as they stand, without considering their constitutionality and formulating solutions based on fair
interpretations, remains the problem with the immigration system. For the last five decades, the
U.S. has reverted to following laws created in the 1960s instead of actively reforming them. If
merely interpreting a statute could stand instead of using judicial activism to strike it down,
"separate but equal" laws would still be an American reality. Each branch of government is tasked
with managing the balance of power, which is the beauty of the design of American democracy.
Therefore, just as the courts have been the voice of reason in striking down Jim Crow Laws,
implementing integration in schools, 120 outlining a woman's right to choose,121 and deciding the
legality of gay marriage,12 2 immigration reform should not be any different. "Injustice anywhere
is a threat to justice everywhere." 123
vi.

Solutions

In terms of seeking solutions for the criminalization of immigrants who have had the
misfortune of being tangled up in the crimmigration system, Justice Breyer, in his Jennings dissent,
stated that:
If there is no reasonable basis for treating these confined noncitizens worse than
ordinary defendants charged with crimes, 18 U. S. C. §3142; worse than convicted
criminals appealing their convictions, § 3143(b); worse than civilly committed
citizens. . .;worse than identical noncitizens found elsewhere within the United
116
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States. .. ; and worse than noncitizens who have committed crimes, served their
sentences, and been definitively ordered removed (but lack a country willing to take
them) their detention without bail is arbitrary. 124
Here, Justice Breyer highlights the negative effects of unfair bond laws imposed in the immigration
system. He explained that at the simplest level, an "alien" is a person and to hold him without bail
would be to deprive him of bodily liberty 125 Since bail is "basic to our system of criminal law",
and a detainee's criminal history is often the major determining factor in whether he even gets a
12
bond hearing under discretionary detention statutes,m
the same should be true under mandatory
detention laws. The Jennings Court referenced the constitutional avoidance canon in reversing the
12 The Court stated that the Ninth Circuit's use of constitutional avoidance
Ninth Circuit's ruling.m
was incorrect because "the canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play only when, after the
application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one
construction." 129 The Court found that the statutes were clear and that the Ninth Circuit misapplied

the canon of constitutional avoidance because its interpretations of the three provisions at issue
were implausible. The Court instructed the Ninth Circuit to review the constitutional issue,
however, the majority's tone suggests that the constitutionality of the detainees' indefinite
detention is of no import at all. 130 The solution then would be to avoid the use of literal
interpretation of statutes which could be otherwise interpreted 131
Another solution the dissent provides is to avoid the Court's decision in Demore v. Kim, which
considered the likely amount of time that a detainee stands to be in jail without bail.132 In Kim, the
Court held that "the Government could constitutionally hold non-citizens who had committed
certain crimes, had completed their sentences, and were in removal proceedings" without bail.133
However, in Kim, the Court's decision was informed by the assumption that a detainee would
likely be kept for a short period of time as necessary to complete proceedings. 134 Justice Breyer
notes in his Jennings dissent that, in terms of bond in current immigration proceedings, the Court
is dealing with "prolonged detention, not the short-term detention at issue in Kim. "Hence Kim,
itself a deviation from the history and tradition of bail and alien detention, cannot help the
Government." 135 Therefore, in order to prevent detainees being held for exorbitant amounts of
time, courts should consider whether an immigrant would be subject to prolonged detention
without having the opportunity to have a bond hearing.
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The courts could also implement safeguards to ensure that detainees are not held for
unreasonable lengths of time. 13 6 The European Union's immigration policies state that detention
must only be used "as a last resort, for the shortest period possible, and can only be maintained as
long as the state authorities are diligently pursuing removal."13 This safeguard of a maximum time
limit on detention gives judges a foolproof way to order release, which would in turn prevent
indefinite detention. 13 It also moves the process along faster by mandating that regardless of the
stage of a detainee's case, once a certain amount of time has passed, "individuals detained under
the Directive must be released." 1 39 Although this could obviously "result in a default minimum
detention period", 140the pros would outweigh the cons simply by reflecting on the detainees in the
Jennings and the exorbitant amount of time they remained detained without a bail hearing. 141
Another safeguard could be following the example of the United Kingdom ("UK") since the
aforementioned solution may not be palatable for the current administration. 142 Like the U.S., the
UK does not have a maximum limit on detention but instead employs a reasonableness test that
determines whether a non-citizen's detention is just. 143Under this test, reasonableness is based on
four principles:
The power to detain can only be used for the purpose of deportation and the state
must actually intend to deport the person at issue; (2) the detention can only last for
a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances; (3) if it becomes apparent that
deportation will not occur within a reasonable period, the power to detain can no
longer be exercised; and (4) the state must act with "reasonable diligence" to effect
deportation. 144

Implementation and use of similar principles to determine whether a person should be detained,
would relieve the pressure on immigration judges that seemingly force them into only
considering a detainee's criminal record and whether they would be a flight risk in deciding
whether to grant bond.
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vii.

Conclusion

The Jennings decision on bond hearings marks a new era in immigration law enforcement with
mass incarceration of non-citizens and undocumented immigrants. The issue of race in the
determination of this case may not be directly addressed, but it is likely to have devastating effects
on Black and Hispanic unauthorized immigrants because they comprise fifty-six percent of all
incarcerated people in the criminal justice system. 145 There are parallels between the criminal
justice and the immigration systems, as these groups are disproportionately represented in the
crimmigration system because they are so heavily represented in the criminal justice system. 146
Therefore, the Court authorizing further punitive interpretations of immigration laws by not
requiring periodic bond hearings further penalizes people of color in America.
Whiteness has continued to be a marker for a person's success in the U.S., whether in the form
of flagrant discrimination, or in the form of institutional discrimination, such as in the immigration
detention system. The U.S. is described by many as a melting pot. The reality is that "people of
color could be used as the fire for the pot but not melted to be in the pot." 147 In termS of immigration
law, the name used to refer to non-citizens (human beings) is "aliens." 1 48 The use of this term in
our immigration laws is reminiscent of Jim Crow laws in the post reconstruction era. 149 The Jim
Crow separate but equal era was a way of othering150 people of color. The use of the word "alien"
disseminates that concept by othering non-citizens. Referring to non-citizens as "aliens"
perpetuates and echoes the less-than narrative on immigrants that has been prevalent since the
1800s, where black people were treated as subhuman and inferiorto white people.151 In the same
way, the Court's inaction in Jennings to protect a basic right of a person located in the U.S., albeit
in a detention facility, to be able to make a case for his or her release when detained by the
government, is an alarming flashback.
People of color continue to be disparately impacted by predatory immigration laws and
policies. The effect of predatory immigration laws on people of color mirror the effects of another
system that preys upon them: the criminal justice system. The Jennings decision perpetuates and
deepens the effects of predatory immigration laws on people of color by deciding that mandatory
145 CriminalJustice FactSheet, supra note 25.
146 Ryo, A Study oflmmigration Bond Hearings, supra note 28, at 119.
147
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detention statutes are to be interpreted as not entitling detained non-citizens to periodic bond
hearings15 As Justice Breyer's dissent in Jennings reminds us, the last time the U.S. successfully
claimed that persons held within the U.S. were without constitutional protection was slavery 153

152 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 833.
153 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 862 (dissent stating

"[n]o one can claim, nor since the time of slavery has anyone
to my knowledge successfully claimed, that persons held within the United States are totally without constitutional
protection.").
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